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COMMENTARY*
CLYDE W. SUMMERS**
I find it difficult to respond to Professor Graglia's presentation be-
cause, if I understand him correctly, our differences run so deeply in such
fundamental premises as the nature of our democratic society, the func-
tion of the Constitution and the role of the courts in our society. Ten
minutes can only give a glimpse into the depths of those differences. Lest
my time run out before I reach my conclusions, let me state them first.
For Professor Graglia, "constitutional law ... is largely the study of
trickery."' For me, constitutional law is a study in the art of construct-
ing and operating a democratic government which protects and promotes
constitutional values.
For Professor Graglia, "U]udicial review is a generally bad idea, inevi-
tably in conflict with both federalism and representative self-govern-
ment .. ."2 For me, judicial review is an essential element for the
development and preservation of humane democratic government.
For Professor Graglia, "the Court has behaved lawlessly in the cause
of ending racial discrimination." 3 For me, the Court's decisions in race
discrimination cases were not only necessary and proper, they marked
the Court's finest hours in breaking down one of our most pernicious and
inhumane social and legal practices.
But now let me try to provide a glimpse of my reasons for these beliefs.
I start with a passage from Professor Graglia. He says: "If judicial re-
view is justifiable at all in our society, however, it is justified in regard to
questions of race."' To Professor Graglia, this seems an empty observa-
tion because for him judicial review is an empty set-it is "a bad idea."
But what leads him to single out race discrimination as a possible area
of judicial review if we were to tolerate it at all? What leads him to this
statement when race discrimination in its most brutal manifestation, le-
gally imposed segregation, was the paradigm product of the two values
* Commentary given at Washington University School of Law on September 29, 1988 at a
conference commemorating the fortieth anniversary of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
** Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania School of Law.
1. Graglia, State Action: Constitutional Phoenix, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 777, 779 (1989).
2. Id. at 782.
3. Id. at 788.
4. Id. at 783.
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he holds most dear-federalism and self-government, more pointedly de-
scribed as states rights and white political control?
The Court's decisions had as their tap root a recognition that the polit-
ical processes, as they in fact functioned, produced and perpetuated this
intolerable social evil which violated explicit constitutional values. If we
were to begin to break down racial inequality, the federal courts could
not stand helplessly by, appealing to states rights and majority rule, but
had to play a leading role. That exemplifies in a dramatic way the appro-
priate and necessary role of judicial review in our system of government.
The checking function of the Court, however, is not limited to af-
firming and enforcing the principle of racial equality. History has taught
us that the misuse of majority control and the failure of the political
process to honor and protect constitutional values goes beyond race dis-
crimination. From time to time it becomes necessary in other areas for
the Court to remind us of, and to require the political process to recog-
nize, those constitutional values which represent what we, in our more
sensitive and less self-serving hours, acknowledge as worthy of
protection.
Therefore, it becomes necessary and proper for the Court to remind us
of the constitutional and social values of the right to free speech, and to
protect dissenters from being silenced by intolerant majorities. The chain
of free speech cases from Schenk 5 and Whitney,6 through Hague v. CIO 7
and Lovell v. Grffin,8 to Brandenburg v. Ohio,9 and Bond v. Floyd,10 has
helped remind and teach us the importance of free speech. They have
reaffirmed for us that freedom for the thought we hate is a fundamental
value of our free society.
So it has become necessary and proper to protect religious sects from
the demands for conformity of intolerant majorities. Pierce v. Society of
Sisters11 protected the right of Catholics to have parochial schools. West
Virginia v. Barnette 2 protected the right of Jehovah Witness children to
5. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
6. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
7. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (right to assemble and discuss national issues is a privilege of national
citizenship).
8. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
9. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
10. 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (state legislature could not refuse to seat elected representative because
of his critical statements on federal government policy in Vietnam).
11. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
12. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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follow their religious beliefs and refuse to salute the flag. We are a better
society and have come closer to our shared ideal of a free society because
of those decisions.
Meyer v. Nebraska 3 protected politically impotent immigrant groups
by invalidating a statute which prohibited the use of a foreign language in
elementary schools. And we now acknowledge that one of the sorriest
failures of the Court was its upholding of the forced evacuation of Japa-
nese Americans from the West Coast during World War II.'" Our na-
tional apology for this failure of the political process comes more than
forty-five years too late. The Court could have saved us from this
disgrace.
Now I to come to Shelley v. Kraemer,'5 and my text here comes again
from Professor Graglia's paper. He writes: "[C]onstitutional limits
should apply to nongovernment action whenever it is not significantly
distinguishable from government action in terms of effects and justifica-
tion."' 16 This is also my perspective of Shelley v. Kraemer, and it is this
text which, for me, makes it right.
The racial discrimination in Shelley v. Kraemer was private action
based on established notions of private property to be enforced by neutral
principles. In traditional legal doctrine of the time, private use of prop-
erty was of no constitutional concern to the Court; in legalese, there was
no state action. The Court in Buchanan v. Warley 17 had invalidated a
city ordinance which enforced segregated housing. But private develop-
ers had achieved the same result by blanketing many urban areas with
restrictive covenants which ran with the land in perpetuity. In Professor
Graglia's language, this was a result "not significantly distinguishable
from government action in terms of effects and justification.' I
The Court's decision was, in my view, a modest one. It simply said
that the courts should not be parties to this use of private power. They
should not enforce claims of property rights when those property rights
were exercised to enforce housing segregation. Whatever private actors
may do on their own, the courts should not be the enforcers of actions
which deny constitutional values.
13. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
14. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
15. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
16. Graglia, supra note 1, at 781.
17. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
18. Graglia, supra note 1, at 781.
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To me it is enough to ask, "Would you have the courts do otherwise?
Would you have the courts play handmaiden and enforcers for Jim
Crow?" This, it seems to me, was the underlying force motivating many
of the state action cases which Professor Graglia described as lawless19:
the refusal to allow the law of trespass, or disturbance of the peace, or
privatization of public functions to enforce private denial of equal treat-
ment for blacks.
I accept and endorse Professor Graglia's proposition that constitu-
tional limits should apply equally to nongovernmental action "whenever
it is not significantly distinguishable from government action in terms of
effects and justification."20 In this I believe he is squarely on target. But
he fires with an empty gun, for he would not enforce constitutional limits
on governmental action; he rejects judicial review and denies that the
Court has a role in enforcing or protecting constitutional rights. For
myself, I would protect those rights with a legal double barreled shotgun,
fully loaded.
One barrel of legal protection is the state action barrel. It seems to me
that applying Professor Graglia's test, Lloyd v. Tanner21 must be wrong.
There the corporate owner of a shopping center, covering fifty acres with
sixty stores and parking for one thousand cars, barred Vietnam objectors
from distributing handbills announcing a meeting to protest the Vietnam
War. Let us pass over the likeness to Marsh v. Alabama.22 This was
Hague v. CIO 23 in private uniform. Lloyd used the force of law of crimi-
nal trespass to enforce restrictions on freedom of expression. Instead of
Mayor "I am the law" Hague, it is the corporation "I am the law"
Lloyd, closing the marketplace of ideas. In Professor Graglia's terms,
the nongovernmental action was "not significantly distinguishable from
government action in terms of effects and justification."24
So also, it seems to me, the Court was wrong in Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn,25 in holding that a private school could dismiss a teacher for ex-
pressing views which would be protected if spoken by a public school
19. Id. at 788.
20. Id. at 781.
21. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
22. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (government may not remain passive while owners of a "company
town" utilize their private power to suppress speech).
23. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See supra note 7.
24. Graglia, supra note 1, at 781.
25. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
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teacher. This is simply Pickering v. Board of Education26 in private
dress. Political and intellectual discussion is equally impoverished, and
the market place of ideas is similarly distorted.
By the same reasoning, I believe that Blum v. Yaretsky,27 in which
welfare patients were shunted to low care facilities without notice, hear-
ing, standards or reasons, is indistinguishable from government action in
effect and justification. Similarly, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison,28
which allowed a public utility to cut off service without notice or hearing,
must be wrong if we follow Professor Graglia's test of when nongovern-
mental action should be equated with governmental action.
Professor Graglia applauds these decisions, not because he believes
they draw a justifiable line between governmental action and nongovern-
mental action, but because he sees shrivelling the state action doctrine as
a device whereby the Court can limit judicial review. Professor Graglia
would be happy to see judicial review reduced, to use Lincoln's expres-
sion, to "soup made from the shadow of a starved pigeon."
This is but the first barrel of my legal shotgun. The second barrel has
a choke which spreads the shot more widely. The state action doctrine
serves the purpose of circumscribing the role of the courts in protecting
and promoting constitutional rights and values. We must recognize that
the capability and resources of the courts, acting through the judicial
process, have practical and principled limits. The courts, however, are
not the only branch of government responsible for protecting and pro-
moting constitutional rights and values. The executive and the legisla-
ture also have an overriding responsibility to obey the Constitution. For
a presidential candidate to say he would find a reason to sign into law a
pledge of allegiance bill which the Supreme Court has said is unconstitu-
tional, shows a gross disowning of responsibility which the Constitution
imposes on the office he seeks. For a congressman to vote for a bill
which he knows, sometimes even hopes, is unconstitutional, and to push
the responsibility for dealing with it onto the courts, earns him the
designation of political charlatan.
This is but the vulgar negative side, the constitutional obligation of the
executive and the legislature not to take action which violates constitu-
26. 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (public school teacher may not be dismissed from employment for
exercising right to speak on issues of public importance).
27. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
28. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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tional rights, and their responsibility not to place the burden on the
courts to declare their actions invalid.
Much more important is the responsibility of the executive and the
legislature to act affirmatively to protect and enlarge constitutional rights
and values. The Civil Rights Act of 196429 was not just another legisla-
tive act like a tax bill or a law against drugs. Although nearly a hundred
years late, it represented the partial discharge by Congress and the Presi-
dent of their responsibility to give life and meaning to the constitutional
values expressed in the fourteenth amendment by protecting against pri-
vate discrimination.
The National Labor Relations Act 30 was not just another labor statute;
it was an expression of the constitutional responsibility of the political
branches to protect crucial areas of free speech and assembly from pri-
vate restraints by employers. The Right of Privacy Act 31 is not just a law
about record keeping. It is a legislative-executive elaboration and exten-
sion of the constitutional value of the right of privacy.
There are many fundamental rights which the courts cannot protect,
particularly against denial by nongovernmental action and coercive or
sovereign use of claimed property rights. The threats to individual free-
dom, fair treatment, due process, personal dignity and privacy are today
much greater from nongovernmental action than governmental action,
and the courts cannot be the sole guardian. The courts alone can never
be more than the last bulwark against the most egregious abuses of pri-
vate power.
It is the affirmative constitutional obligation of the political branches
to protect and enlarge constitutional rights, to shield them from nongov-
ernmental restraints. The more the political branches meet this responsi-
bility, the less will be the need for judicial review. But when the political
branches violate or fail in their responsibility to protect constitutional
rights, and history has demonstrated that political majorities do not al-
ways respect minority rights, then the courts must act as the ultimate
guardian of these rights. Judicial review is necessary in our political sys-
tem because history has taught us that our political processes in practice
do not always recognize and protect fundamental values embedded in the
Constitution. If we are to fulfill those values, if we are to have the demo-
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-h (1982).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1982).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa-6 (1982).
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cratic society envisioned by the Constitution, then the courts must do
their part.
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